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T is a great privilege to participate in this lecture series in honor of
Judge Irving L. Goldberg. When I was a law student, Judge Goldberg
was already a legend-a hero we admired deeply for his wisdom, his
principle, his courage, and for his willingness to enliven the pages of the
Federal Reporter with his witty writing and love of puns. Some years
later in the course of my practice, I again had occasion to admire Judge
Goldberg's principled consistency. He would have upheld the right of
privacy against both the abortion and the sodomy laws. That is, he held
not only with Roe but also with Baker against Wade.1 Fittingly, historian
David Garrow, in his recent history of Roe v. Wade, gave Judge Goldberg
the last word, quoting his statement that an opinion "should have not
only a beginning and an end, but a future. ''2 That certainly will always be
true of Judge Goldberg's opinions.
II. CHANGES IN THE POLITICS OF FREE SPEECH
My topic is a recent sea change in the politics of free speech. In the old
days, the First Amendment was a banner for the political left in its strug-
gle against censorial forces perceived as coming from the right. Holmes
and Brandeis wrote the opinions that founded our modern free speech
tradition in cases involving the prosecution of communists, anarchists, so-
cialists, syndicalists, pacifists, and other "reds." The American Civil Lib-
erties Union (ACLU), at the outset, represented mostly trade unionists
and draft resisters. Street demonstrations by labor unions brought about
modern public forum doctrine. And, after the long drought of McCarthy-
ism, the civil rights marches, protests, and sit-ins of the 1950s and 1960s
pioneered new First Amendment ground, establishing doctrines against
vagueness, overbreadth, and prior restraint. In the old days, the enemies
© Copyright 1994 Kathleen M. Sullivan. All rights reserved.
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1. See Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Sup'. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970), affd in part, rev'd in part,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 293 (5th Cir. 1985) (Goldberg, J., dis-
senting) ("If ever there was a constitutional right to privacy, Texas has violated it by bla-
tantly intruding into the private sex lives of fully consenting adults."), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022 (1986).
2. DAVID J. GARROW,. LIBERTY & SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE
MAKING OF Roe v. Wade 712 (1994).
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of free speech were the forces of law and order, anti-communism, and
Jim Crow.
True, by the 1960s and 1970s, free speech advocates applied the princi-
ples they had developed earlier in the century to defending causes of the
political right as well as those of the left. A Ku Klux Klan rally led the
Court in 1969 finally to put teeth in the clear and present danger test by
upholding the right to engage in white supremacist speech, as long as it
did not amount to incitement.3 On this interpretation, the free speech
principle was neutral. The right of free speech was prior to any particular
idea of the good. "[Olne man's vulgarity is another's lyric,"'4 and "the
tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor."'5 The
state was required to leave the contest among viewpoints to private
choice. This neutrality principle of course, was sometimes quite contro-
versial. For example, the ACLU's defense of neo-Nazis who sought to
goosestep in brownshirts past Holocaust survivors in Skokie, Illinois,
stretched it nearly to the breaking point.6
But by the 1990s, both liberals and conservatives seemed to have
reached consensus on this neutrality principle, at least on the Supreme
Court. Recall how the Court upheld, within a few Terms of each other,
the right of a white racist to burn a cross 7 and the right of Maoists to burn
the American flag.8 These cases had more in common with each other
than fire. In the cases of both flag-burning and cross-burning, the Court
denied the power of government to suppress symbolic conduct for its
message, no matter how offensive it might be to people looking on. In
this series of cases, Justice Brennan and Justice Scalia alike supported
free speech libertarianism, signaling at least a temporary political
consensus.
Just as the Supreme Court reached consensus on free speech libertari-
anism, however, new fractures and seismic shifts began to destabilize the
politics of free speech in the nation at large. If it used to be that censor-
ship was associated with the right and free speech libertarianism with the
left, today the political poles have switched. Now we hear new calls from
the left for speech regulation and arguments from the right against it.
Professor Jack Balkin fittingly labels this phenomenon "ideological
drift."9 The old scorecard no longer tells us who the players are. Radical
feminists team up with family-values fundamentalists to argue for the reg-
ulation of sexually explicit speech. And cigarette manufacturer Phillip
3. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).
4. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
5. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
6. See Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party of Am., 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978);
see also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), affd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2550 (1992).
8. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,
420 (1989).
9. J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 383.
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Morris, accustomed to political support from Senator Jesse Helms, sur-
prisingly finds the ACLU joining in a vigorous argument that tobacco
advertising deserves First Amendment protection.
Let me highlight five examples of new calls for speech regulation com-
ing from the left. First, there has been a movement by some feminists to
regulate pornography as sex discrimination against women. Their claim is
that much of the multi-billion dollar trade in sexually explicit magazines
and videos amounts to the subordination of women in print and cellu-
loid.10 This movement, led by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dwor-
kin, has failed to achieve any lasting legal victory, having failed either at
the polling place, on the mayor's desk, or in court.'1 But their arguments
and their premises have percolated into the legal culture.
Indeed they have heavily influenced my second example: the move-
ment to regulate "hate speech" through campus code or municipal ordi-
nance. Advocates of hate speech regulation would regulate messages of
racial inferiority conveyed in a persecutory, hateful, degrading, or insult-
ing way.' 2 Some of their proposals would apply to members of all races;
some only to groups that have been historically oppressed. Some of their
proposals track the old doctrine that fighting words are not protected by
the First Amendment; some would extend that notion to words that cause
fright or flight as well as fights.' 3 Some of their proposals are limited to
race; others extend to members of other ascriptive groups. But they all
have in common the view that such speech constitutes subordination, and
the remedy cannot be "more speech."
The third example of new calls for speech regulation from the left is
advocacy of greater regulation of expenditures for speech by wealthy in-
dividuals and corporations. Since the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court has
recognized that "money talks" in politics, but the Court has held such
"speech" to be constitutionally protected. For example, the Court struck
down federal ceilings on campaign expenditures' 4 and state restrictions
on speech by corporations in referendum campaigns.15 Advocates of
greater campaign finance regulation say this gives too much political in-
fluence to aggregated corporate wealth.
So far, my examples have come mostly from academic sources; let me
turn now to a fourth and fifth example from the contemporary political
arena. Consider the calls spearheaded by Attorney General Janet Reno
10. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 127-213 (1987).
11. See, e.g., American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 334 (7th Cir. 1985)
(invalidating as thought control an Indianapolis ordinance against the graphic sexual sub-
ordination of women), affd mem., 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
12. See, e.g., MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THE-
ORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993).
13. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Responding to Abusive Speech on Campus: A Model
Statute, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 50.
14. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143-44 (1976).
15. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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for the curtailment of television violence.16 The argument for such regu-
lation is that violent programming makes for violent people by inuring
them to violence and conditioning them to its use. Calls for regulation
extend not only to over-the-air broadcasters, who have long resented
their treatment as second-class First Amendment citizens, 17 but also to
cable, video games, and other media not yet subject to comprehensive
regulation.
Fifth and finally, consider various recent measures to curtail obstruc-
tion of abortion clinics by anti-abortion demonstrators: the passage of
the federal Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act,18 the passage of
various local ordinances establishing a protective "bubble" around clinics,
and the issuance of injunctions such as the Florida order creating a buffer
zone around an abortion clinic that the Supreme Court upheld in part last
Term. 19 Here Operation Rescue and other anti-abortion groups say that
they should be protected by the same free speech doctrines that protected
the civil rights movement, but advocacy groups that typically argue for
free speech pointedly have not flocked to their defense.
What do the new speech regulators in these five examples have in com-
mon? In common they reject the three pillars of the modern free speech
consensus. Let me first describe what those pillars are, and then describe
how the new speech regulators would shake them down.
III. MODERN FREE SPEECH CONSENSUS
The modern free speech consensus rests on three fundamental distinc-
tions: those between mind and body, public and private, and purpose and
effect. Begin with the mind/body distinction. In First Amendment con-
troversies, this distinction is sometimes called the speech/conduct or the
expression/action distinction. Free speech libertarianism holds speech
privileged above conduct. Government may regulate the clash of bodies
but not the stirring of hearts and minds. Speech may not be curtailed in
order to protect people from psychic injury or from anger, alarm, resent-
ment, or emotional distress. "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but
names can never hurt me." Speech may be curtailed to prevent material
harm, but that harm must be real and nearly nigh. There must be clear
and present danger. Domino theories will not do. Inciting a lynch mob
may be punished, but preaching racial supremacy may not.
This mind/body distinction is inscribed deeply in modern First Amend-
ment law. The flag-burning and the cross-burning cases held that when
expression offends your sensibilities, the solution is not to call the sheriff
but to turn the other cheek. Contrast the case of racially motivated vio-
lence. While the Court struck down St. Paul's punishment of racist sym-
16. See Michael Wines, Reno Chastises TV Networks on Violence in Programming,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1993, at Al.
17. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
18. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994).
19. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 2516 (1994).
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bols, it upheld Wisconsin's aggravated penalties for throwing a racist
punch.20
The second pillar of the modern free speech consensus is the public/
private distinction. In our conventional view of the First Amendment,
censorship is the restriction of speech by the government. To be sure,
private parties sometimes restrict the speech of others too. Simon and
Schuster rejected Bret Easton Ellis's manuscript of American Psycho as
excessively violent and misogynist-they paid him his fee and packed him
on his way.21 Time Warner pulled Ice T's song Cop Killer from the rec-
ord stores when police officers and others expressed outrage at its
lyrics. 22 But such actions, the public/private distinction holds, are not
rightly called censorship. They are, rather, exercises of editorial discre-
tion, market judgment, social responsibility, or just plain taste. Why the
different treatment? The government alone has a monopoly of force. If
Simon and Schuster rejects you, you can go to Random House. If the
government bans your novel, you may have to move to France.
The Supreme Court readily accepts this distinction, for example in
cases holding that shopping center owners are not censors when they bar
leafletters from their malls.23 True, the Court has displeased free speech
advocates in recent years by declaring more and more government action
to be "private," freeing not only shopping center owners but the govern-
ment itself from the constraints of the First Amendment in some areas.
Not everything government does is "public," says the Court; in the mod-
ern world, government does many things other than wield coercive
power. When government operates with its "private" rather than its
"public" face, the Court has given it considerable discretion to discrimi-
nate among subject matters and speakers.
For example, the doctrine of the public forum has long held that gov-
ernment may not regulate the content of speech in public streets and
parks. But in recent years, the Court has withdrawn more and more gov-
ernment property from public forum status, exempting it from First
Amendment limitations that apply to government in streets and parks.
Jailhouse entrances, military bases, teachers' mailboxes, charitable fund
drives in federal offices, post office sidewalks, and airport terminals have
all been held "non-public forums," or in other words, the operations of
government with a private face.24 In these settings, many content restric-
20. Compare R.A.V. v. City of 'St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) with Wisconsin v.
Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
21. Roger Cohen, Bret Easton Ellis Answers Critics of "American Psycho," N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 1991, at C13.
22. Richard M. Clurman, Pushing All the Hot Buttons, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1992, § 2,
at 1.
23. See, e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
24. See, respectively, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828 (1976); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Corne-
lius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,




Likewise, the Court has held that in some cases, when the government
acts as patron, it may impose speech-restrictive conditions on its grants.
For example, in Rust v. Sullivan,25 the Court held that the First Amend-
ment did not bar government from conditioning the receipt of federal
family planning funds upon the recipient's vow of silence about the avail-
ability or desirability of abortion. When government acts as patron, not
policeman, the Court implied, the government is itself a speaker and may
determine what is to be said. He who pays the piper calls the tune. He
who takes the king's shilling becomes the king's man.
But even in these cases, the public/private distinction runs deep and
retains some bite. Government is not as unfettered in its discretion as
Time Warner or Random House. The Court has always cautioned that
government may not "aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas" with
carrots, just as it may not with sticks. 26
This leads me to the third pillar of contemporary free speech law: the
distinction between purpose and effect. In a variety of settings, the Court
has said that viewpoint discrimination is the cardinal First Amendment
sin. Thus it matters what government is aiming at, not just what it hap-
pens to hit. If a law aims at the content of speech, it is presumptively
invalid. But if a law is content-neutral, then the fact that it hurts some
speakers more than others is not of First Amendment concern.
For example, consider time, place, and manner regulation in the public
forum. If such a challenged regulation is content-neutral in form, then
the government nearly always wins. Yet some such regulations can be
disproportionately rough on speakers with unpopular things to say. For
example, a law against mutilating your draft card is especially rough on
draft-card burners engaged in political protest; not many people use draft
cards to light barbecues. But the Supreme Court readily upheld such a
law.27 Along similar lines, I once helped Professor Laurence H. Tribe
argue that devotees of Hare Krishna had a First Amendment right to
proselytize in the open spaces of the Minnesota State Fair and not be
confined to a rented booth. We argued that Minnesotans would flock to
the booths of the Methodists, Presbyterians, or Episcopalians, but that
Hare Krishna, if confined to a booth waiting for customers, would have a
long and very quiet day. In other words, we argued that the booth rule
operated as de facto discrimination against unpopular or unorthodox
groups. We lost; the Supreme Court upheld the booth rule as a reason-
able regulation of the place of speech.2 8
In short, in free speech law, as in current equal protection doctrine, the
disparate impact of government regulation does not matter. Only invidi-
25. 500 U.S. 173, 196 (1991).
26. Id. at 192 (citing Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S.
540, 548 (1983), quoting Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
27. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968).
28. Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 649
n.12 (1981) ("The argument is interesting but has little force.").
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ous intent raises a constitutional red flag. Not everyone has equal speak-
ing opportunities, but, under the conventional view, that is not the fault
of the state. As Anatole France once wrote ironically, "The law in its
majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges .... ,,29 Likewise, the Court has held that the First Amendment
does not invalidate a rule that bars the Boy Scouts, as well as homeless
demonstrators, from sleeping overnight in Lafayette Park.30 The pur-
pose/effect distinction serves to remove such laws from strict First
Amendment review. Only censorship that is intentional, not merely neg-
ligent, concerns the current Court.
IV. THE NEW SPEECH REGULATORS
Now come the new speech regulators who would shake each of these
three pillars down.31 They reject the notion that these three distinctions
are worth preserving. Their specific attacks on these distinctions are
linked with three broader trends in thought about knowledge, law, and
power: social constructionism, legal realism, and egalitarianism.
A. SOCIAL CONSTRucTIONISM
Begin with what the new regulators say about the mind/body distinc-
tion. They deny the childhood adage that "sticks and stones can break
your bones but names can never hurt you." As every child knows from
some early encounter on a playground, names can hurt and words can
wound. Psychic and physical injuries are not that different. Indeed scars
on the soul can be worse than those of the flesh; as Professor Charles
Lawrence III interprets Brown v. Board of Education,32 it was a speech
case, prohibiting government from symbolically telling black children
they were inferior in a way that would do permanent damage not to their
bodies but rather to their "hearts and minds. '33 That kind of damage is
reenacted, say advocates of hate speech codes, every time a white frat
boy utters racist catcalls at a black woman student, and, they say, a public
university should not be stopped by the First Amendment from stopping
him.
The new speech regulators thus relativize the mind/body distinction by
equating some verbal with physical assault. They deem hate speech an
act of aggression with real costs to its victims: to be terrified into flight
and silence can be as bad an injury as a punch in the nose. But much of
the argument for the new speech regulation goes beyond equating some
29. ANATOLE FRANCE, LE Lys ROUGE 91 (1894).
30. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (1984).
31. In the following description of arguments made by the new speech regulators, I
draw loosely from such works as CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS (1993); CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Balkin, supra note
9; and Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1321 (1992).
32. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
33. Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 462.
1994]
SMU LAW REVIEW
speech with violent action. This stronger form of the argument goes fur-
ther in denying the distinction between mind and body: it says speech
constructs us and conditions our actions; it makes us who we are. Culture
determines power; it is not the other way around. Speech and conduct
are continuous; ideas construct reality and reflect it back. Therefore,
both are equally regulable if regulation serves desirable ends.
In this view, the problem with pornography, hate speech, or television
violence, is not just that they frighten women, coeds, or children, or move
them to nightmares and tears. The problem is that they eroticize sexual
dominance, reinforce racial hierarchy, or glamorize violence in ways that
construct or reconstruct us. In this view, they make our society differ-
ent-more sexist, more racist, more violent-than it would be if a differ-
ent rhetoric prevailed. In this view, the speech to be regulated does not
cause harm; it is harm. Thus, it is not enough to shield the tender eyes
and ears of those offended; the speech must itself be eliminated and the
speaker reeducated or transformed. If you want to change reality, you
have to change the speech that constructs it.
These sorts of arguments reject individualistic epistemology in favor of
a social constructionist view. We are not, say the constructionists, the
rational and isolated monads hypothesized by liberal thought-freely
choosing our own ends, desires, and preferences as we please. We are
rather situated, or as Professor Michael Sandel puts it, "encumbered" by
the cultural contexts into which we are born or thrust.34 We do not just
act on the world; the world acts on us and we are the product of the
institutional forces around us. We are not only what we eat; we are what
we read, what fashion tells us to be, what we see on television, whether
the gospel station or MTV. Women are constructed by patriarchy in this
view; hence the smile on the porn star's face is an emanation of false
consciousness. Members of traditionally oppressed racial groups are con-
structed by racism. Individuals are constructed by their social environ-
ments and their social relations.
For the new speech regulators, this epistemology dictates a government
response. If we are socially malconstructed, in their view, government
should come to the rescue; we should use the First Amendment not as
shield but as sword. Government should stop speech that constructs us in
ways we decide we do not like, for example because we think it denies
racial or sexual equality or makes our streets less safe. To the extent
some of us have been socially constructed into silence, the effect of such
regulation will be, they predict, to free our small, still voices, in the long
run enhancing speech rather than restricting it.
B. LEGAL REALISM
This brings me to the new regulators' dismissal of the conventional
public/private distinction. Viewing constitutional law generally as a
34. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 181 (1982).
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latecomer to the insights of legal realism, they would treat more nomi-
nally "private" action as public and thus regulable by the state. Why?
Because in this view, private power can be just as dangerous to the liber-
ties of the less powerful as can state power. Old free speech libertarians
always knew who the enemy was: government, government, government,
a.k.a. the awesome power of the state. New free speech regulators see
the enemy elsewhere. Shopping mall owners shut the people out of what
is today the functional equivalent of the streets and parks. The influence
of money skews political campaigns. Corporations drown out other
voices, defeating tax or insurance initiatives by blanketing the airwaves
with expensive ads. Racist, sexist, anti-semitic, or homophobic verbal ter-
ror silences minorities on college campuses. And pornography is men's
boot on women's neck, stifling any voice that might talk back.
What legal consequences follow from the new speech regulators' view?
Taken to a logical extreme, this view would dissolve the usual narrow
doctrine of state action, and permit the silenced or excluded actually to
sue private entities for violating their First Amendment rights. Some
states, unlike the United States Supreme Court, have actually adopted
this view with respect to shopping centers. 35 The more moderate and
common version of this view would simply eliminate the First Amend-
ment as a barrier to more legislation that redistributes speech. In this
view, government should be regarded as enhancing and not restricting
speech when it tunes down the voice of the rich in political campaigns so
that the less rich will have more of a fighting chance. And by shutting up
campus bigots, this view holds, hate speech codes will enable the voices of
the once-victimized to emerge and finally be heard.
Just as the assault on the mind/body distinction in free speech law
stems from the epistemological trend of social constructionism, so the at-
tack on the public/private distinction stems from the jurisprudential trend
of legal realism. The basic premise here, derived from the thought of
legal realists earlier in this century, is that there is no such thing, in organ-
ized society, as a purely private sphere. All private power is a product of
law; you gain and keep your money because of the law of property, tort
and contract. Those laws can change: the New Deal, for example, estab-
lished that liberty of contract no longer barred the enactment of mini-
mum wage and maximum hour laws.
All the new speech regulators want, they say, is a "New Deal for
speech," to use Professor Cass Sunstein's phrase. 36 We abandoned lais-
sez-faire philosophy in the marketplace for goods and services back in
1937. Why do we still have faith in the invisible hand in the so-called
"marketplace of ideas"? How can Adam Smith, long laid to rest in due
process and equal protection challenges to economic regulation, have
found reincarnation in the First Amendment when the issue is the regula-
35. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (reviewing shop-
ping center's claim in opposition to such a provision of the California Constitution).
36. SUNSTEIN, supra note 31, at 16.
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tion of speech? In short, in this view, speaking power is as maldistributed
in the marketplace of ideas as bargaining power was in the commercial
marketplace before labor legislation, rent control, and various implied
warranties came along. If we force IBM and AT&T into competition,
why not break up the monied interests whose wealth enables them to
dominate our television-driven political campaigns? If we apply the an-
tidiscrimination rules of Title VII to sex discrimination in hiring and pro-
motion, why not also to the "hostile environment" created when firemen
plaster the stationhouse with glossies from the latest Hustler magazine?
If we diversify the racial composition of our student bodies, why not use
speech codes to redistribute speaking power as well as seats in the class-
room from the traditionally advantaged to the traditionally oppressed?
C. EGALITARIANISM
Once the new regulators' application of legal realism strips the private
order of its presumptive immunity from regulation, the next question be-
comes what the governing norm of regulation ought to be. The new
speech regulators implicitly value equality. They favor paternalism and
redistribution for speech as for other markets. It follows from this im-
plicit substantive commitment that they reject the third pillar of the con-
ventional free speech consensus: the distinction between the purpose and
effect of government regulation in which only purpose matters. They ar-
gue instead that what matters is the effect that government action has on
public discourse, whether its purpose is deliberately censorial or not.
Intent-based analysis generally corresponds with notions of negative
liberty and corrective justice. Freedom means freedom "from" govern-
ment interference in the presumptively private order. State action that
transgresses that boundary may be punished, like private trespasses. Ef-
fect-based analysis, in contrast, corresponds with notions of positive lib-
erty and distributive justice. Freedom means freedom "to" avail oneself
of promised liberties, and if the minimal preconditions for such an exer-
cise are missing in the existing private order, then government may or
perhaps must provide them.
In arguing for the priority of distributive justice, the new arguments for
speech regulation resemble other shifts that look to consequences rather
than intent. For example, intentional tort doctrines gave way to negli-
gence and strict liability, on the theory that limiting liability to the mor-
ally blameworthy was less important than achieving the optimum level of
social deterrence. Similarly, the Court in some cases has rejected color-
blindness as the principle of equal protection in order to permit race-
based remedies for past discrimination from which non-victims may bene-
fit and for which non-sinners may pay. As Justice Blackmun argued in
Bakke that, "[iun order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
[Vol. 48
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of race," 37 so the new speech regulators argue that getting to free speech
for all may depend on limiting the speech of some. In short, they would
replace First Amendment corrective justice-stop government only when
it commits the sin of "thought control"-with a notion of distributive jus-
tice in which regulation is permissible insofar as it brings about a more
desirable distribution of speech. In this view, the purpose/effect distinc-
tion is largely jettisoned.
What legal consequences follow from rejecting this distinction? As al-
ready discussed, the new regulators by and large favor greater regulation
of hate speech and pornography on redistributive grounds. They also ad-
vocate such measures as greater scrutiny of content-neutral regulations
with adverse distributive effects, greater guarantees of access to the mass
media for speakers with limited private resources, and reversal of deci-
sions barring greater regulation of political campaign expenditures.
V. CONCLUSION
The new speech regulators demand a response from those who would
leave speech mostly deregulated; and they deserve a response that goes
beyond the rote and reflexive invocation of free speech as an article of
faith. The appeal to the First Amendment as self-evident truth may be no
more effective, as Professor Henry Louis Gates Jr. recently cautioned,
than Samuel Johnson's attempt to refute Bishop Berkeley merely by
kicking a stone. 38
Let me briefly sketch here the tentative beginnings of such a re-
sponse-the outlines of a defense of progressive free speech libertarian-
ism even in a postmodern age. The argument might take two forms. The
first would try to articulate what distinctive attributes speech might have
that make it different from the goods and services that government may
freely regulate after the New Deal. For example, speech may be uniquely
close to consciousness. Ideas can go underground more easily and intrac-
tably than goods and services. It is possible to round up goods sold on
the black market, including samizdat or underground books and pam-
phlets, far more easily than it is to erase the traces that such literature
leaves in the mind. Thus the enforcement of restrictions on speech might
be inherently or structurally limited in a way that restrictions on other
activities are not. Similarly, speech might be uniquely privileged as the
currency of peaceful political change. Such categorical distinctions be-
tween speech and other activities, of course, will vary according to one's
theory of why free speech is valuable in the first place.
A second approach would focus on institutional rather than on onto-
logical concerns. It may be that any distinction we think of as ontological
ultimately rests on institutional concerns, in which case the two ap-
37. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).




proaches converge, but that's another lecture. An institutional approach
would try to articulate why we might mistrust government regulation of
speech more than we mistrust government regulation of markets for
goods and services.
Here are three possibilities. First, speech regulation may be more in-
tractably ineffective than other forms of regulation. For example, con-
sider the well-known "banned in Boston" phenomenon-making speech
taboo may perversely increase demand. Second, there may be a greater
risk of error when government regulates speech than when it regulates
commercial markets-in other words, a greater danger of governmental
abuse when government redistributes participation in public discourse
than when it redistributes material power and income. For example, in-
cumbents might systematically overestimate the bad consequences of
speech by challengers or dissidents.
Third, there might be special dangers in trusting government to change
culture even if we trust it to reallocate some aspects of material power.
The new speech regulators engage in a non sequitur when they move
from the premise that we are socially constructed to the conclusion that
we should give the state a monopoly on our reconstruction. Epistemol-
ogy does not entail polity. To recognize that we are socially constructed
does not tell us what to do. For example, consumer boycotts, pressure for
warning labels, and counter-demonstrations arguably have proved more
effective than any speech code enacted to date. Indeed, speech codes
have been applied to students of color and antipornography regulations
against gay and lesbian literature. Using the state to change culture
before power in an unequal world might systematically backfire; the state
might be too reflective of prevailing ideologies to be a reliable instrument
of ideological affirmative action.
These are but a few possible lines of defense of a constitutional regime
that deregulates the "marketplace of ideas" even while it permits the reg-
ulation of markets for goods and services. Each merits far more elabora-
tion and debate than there is time for here. But I believe this project a
worthy one for those in my generation whose respect for the new speech
regulators' insights does not extend to agreement with their proposed
solutions.
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